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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State argues that Appellant failed to demonstrate that current procedural
safeguards are inadequate to assure the constitutional mandates of due process. However,
to the contrary, Appellant argued at length in his opening brief that, notwithstanding current
safeguards, false confessions still occur and innocent people are convicted of crimes to which
they falsely confessed. Appellant further noted that, where a dispute arises as to what was

said during an interrogation, courts generally favor the recollection of a police officer over
that of the accused. Consequently, where there is a dispute, the procedural inadequacies of
the current system are further compounded. Furthermore, Appellant argued that dicta in
recent Utah cases, which merely encourages the recording of interrogations, has not remedied
these procedural infirmities such that a judicially mandated rule under the principles of due
process is required. For the foregoing reasons, which were all detailed in Appellant's
opening brief, current procedural safeguards inadequately protect a defendant's right to
fundamental fairness and due process of law.
Moreover, there are myriad policy considerations supporting the adoption of a rule
requiring the recording of confessions. A verbatim recording would protect the rights of the
accused, it would protect the rights of police officers wrongfully accused of illegal conduct,
it would protect the interest of the State in presenting compelling video or audio evidence at
trial, and it would serve the interests of the court in ascertaining the truth of what often
occurs behind closed doors. The State cites no compelling policy consideration against the
adoption of such a rule such that, where the rule can be imposed easily and with minimal
expense, the principles of fundamental fairness require its adoption.
The State also asserts that the accuracy of the confession in the instant case was not
disputed. However, Appellant disputed the accuracy of the confession both in substance and
-2-

as to form. The confession was challenged as being substantively inaccurate in that
Appellant professed his innocense and presented much evidence to that end. The statement
was inaccurate in form as Detective Gent admitted under oath that he failed to record certain
parts of the interrogation and Appellant's attendant statements. Consequently, the State's
argument that the accuracy of the statement was undisputed is misplaced.

ARGUMENT
I.

REVERSAL IS WARRANTED WHERE APPELLANT'S
STATEMENT WAS NOT RECORDED NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT IT WAS TAKEN IN A PLACE OF DETENTION
WHERE VERBATIM RECORDING WAS FEASIBLE.

As stated in Appellant's opening brief, Utah courts have long recognized that "no
other class of evidence is as potentially prejudicial to defendants as confessions." State v.
Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477, 489-90 (Utah 2003); quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of
Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 271, 293 (1975). "The
importance o f . . . a tape recording [of a confession] lies in the fact that trial courts and
appellate courts tend to trust police officers' recollections of what occurred at the expense
of the criminal defendant's account. Thus, in the absence of a tape recording, the prosecuting
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authorities invariably win the swearing contest." Harris v. State, 678 P.2d 397,414 (Alaska
App. 1984) (Singleton J., concurring and dissenting).
Consequently, "[i]f an officer's memory of a confession is distorted, inaccurate, or
incomplete, whether because of the lapse in time or a variety of psychological factors, the
defendant may be forced into the dilemma of having to waive his right not to testify or
allowing an erroneous account of the confession to go to the jury." State v. Villarreal, 889
P.2d 419, 426-27 (Utah 1995). A rule requiring the recording of custodial interrogations
would serve to protect a defendant's rights and constitute a step forward in the search for
truth. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506-07 (8th Cir. 1972).

A.

Appellant Challenged the Accuracy of the Statement as Selectively
"Recorded" by Detective Gent Both in Substance and as to Form.

As the State has noted, Appellant urges this Court to adopt the narrow rule enunciated
by the Alaska Supreme Court in Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985). There, the
court phrased its narrow rule as follows, "the rule that we adopt today requires that custodial
interrogations in a place of detention, including the giving of the accused's Miranda rights,
must be electronically recorded." Id.; (Aplee Br. at 12). The State argues that, even if this
rule were adopted, Appellant's statement would be admissible nonetheless in the instant case
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because the accuracy of the statement is undisputed. (Aplee Br. at 25-27). However,
Appellant did dispute the accuracy of the statement at the suppression hearing and at trial
both in substance and as to form.
As to form, testimony was elicited at trial indicating that Detective Gent's "record"
of the interview was incomplete and, therefore, inaccurate. Gent stated that he would type
a question into his computer as he asked it and then would type Appellant's response "word
for word." (Tr. Vol. Ill at 24). However, the typed statement did not depict the interaction
between Appellant and Gent "word for word." For instance, Gent conceded that he likely
told Appellant to stop or slow down at places because he could not type quickly. (Tr. Vol.
Ill at 43-44). This interaction was not "recorded." More importantly though, Gent stated
that there were substantive parts of the interview that he did not record at all. At one point
Appellant began asking questions and Gent did not type the questions or his answers thereto.
(Tr. Vol. Ill at 63).
In this case, Gent chose what parts of the interview to type and what parts to exclude.
The inculpatory parts of the statement were "recorded," but there is no record of this
interview or Appellant's statement in its entirety. The "recording" that Gent typed was
incomplete at best. Consequently, the typed interview did not comport to actual interaction
between Appellant and Gent. A verbatim recording would have recorded Defendant's
-5-

questions, would have recorded any requests for clarification from either party, and would
have recorded the discourse in its entirety. The statement typed by Gent was not a verbatim
record of this interaction.

Rather, it constituted a selective and incomplete record.

Consequently, as Gent admitted under oath, it was not a verbatim record of the statements
Appellant made during the subject interview. (Tr. Vol. Ill at 63). Therefore, there is
testimony in the record indicating that the statement, as typed by Gent, was inaccurate as to
form. As far as the trial court found that the statement was a verbatim record of the
interrogation, such finding was clearly erroneous in light of Gent's testimony to the contrary.
Perhaps more importantly though, Appellant strongly disputed the accuracy of the
substance of the statement. The State characterizes the statement at issue as a confession.
(See Aplee Br. at 6). The State, therefore, asserts that the statement constituted a full
admission of guilt alone sufficient to sustain a conviction as to all elements of the crime
charged.
The distinction between a confession and an admission, as applied in criminal
law, is not a technical refinement, but based upon the substantive differences
of the character of the evidence educed from each. A confession is a direct
acknowledgment of guilt on the part of the accused, and, by the very force of
the definition, excludes an admission, which, of itself, as applied in criminal
law, is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the
issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt,
but of itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction.
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Riggins v. State, 843 A.2d 115, 126 (Md. App. 2004); (quoting Ford v. State, 29 A.2d 833
(Md. 1943)). However, Appellant strenuously asserted his innocense both before and during
trial. Therefore, if the statement constitutes a full admission as to every element at issue as
the State asserts, it was disputed as to its substantive accuracy.
The purpose of the trial in the instant case was, of course, to determine whether
Appellant was guilty of the crime charged. Throughout the course of trial, Appellant
presented evidence tending to show that he was innocent. To fully reiterate every point in
the record where Appellant elicited testimony or presented evidence tending to show his
innocense would be unnecessarily burdensome. Appellant's position was aptly summarized
in closing argument. He was not guilty of murder because did not intend to kill anyone. He
lacked the requisite mens rea for the crime charged. {See Tr. Vol. IV at 49). Appellant
presented testimony regarding various mental infirmities and prior medical instructions to
support his claim of innocense. (See Tr. Vol. IV at 51,54-57). Where the State characterizes
the statement as a confession, an admission as to every element of the crime charged, much
evidence was presented disputing its substantive accuracy.
Appellant presented evidence calling into question the accuracy of the statement both
in substance and as to form. The substance of the statement was brought into dispute by the
evidence presented supporting Appellant's innocence. The form of the statement was also
-7-

brought into dispute by Detective Gent's own testimony. He conceded that the typed
statement was not a verbatim record of his interaction with Appellant. Rather it was a
selective record with substantive omissions. Consequently, the accuracy of the statement was
disputed and the State's argument in this regard is misplaced.

B.

A Rule Requiring a Verbatim Record of Confessions Where Recording
Is Feasible Is Essential to Ensuring Fundamental Fairness under the
Principles of Due Process,

"A confession - whether true or false - is arguably the most damaging evidence the
government can present in a trial. As a result, when police elicit a false confession, they are
likely to cause the wrongful conviction and imprisonment of an innocent person." Richard
J. Ofshe and Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and
Irrational Action, 74 Denver U.L. Rev. 979,983-84 (1997) (citing John Wigmore, Evidence
in Trials at Common Law § 820b, at 303 (James H. Chadbourne ed., 1970)). Consequently,
the mandates of fundamental fairness require the judicial system to institute whatever
measures are necessary to ensure that evidence of false or wrongfully obtained confessions
is not admitted at trial.
The requirements of fundamental fairness and the coinciding mandates of due process
are not static. Rather, the jurisprudence as to what is required by due process is constantly
-8-

evolving. "Due process clearly did not prohibit this process ofjudicial evolution at the time
of the framing, and it does not do so today." Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,462 (2001).
Courts long held the view espoused by Judge Learned Hand that the reality of an
innocent man being convicted was an "unreal dream." See United States v. Garrson, 291 F.
646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). However, the wave of recent exonerations through new
developments in science and DNA technology brings this conclusion into question. Some
commentators have estimated that false confessions occur in the United States from "a low
of 35 up to 840 annually." Barry Scheck, Peter Neufield, Jim Dwer, Actual Innocence 92
(Doubleday 2000). Regarding exonerations resulting from DNA evidence as compiled by
the Innocence Project, 23 percent of the convictions were based largely upon false
confessions. Id.
The State implies that the procedural safeguards instituted under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), andDickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), adequately ensure
fundamental fairness. (See Aplee. Br. at 20). However, these protections merely protect the
theoretical procedural fairness of the interrogation process. They do not address the inherent
fairness of the judicial process that determines whether these procedural safeguards were
properly applied and whether the confession is itself reliable. Consequently, the verbatim
recording of interrogations is necessary to ensure that the prophylactic safeguards from
-9-

Miranda and Dickerson are enforced in a judicial setting. Again, in the absence of such
safeguards, "trial courts and appellate courts tend to trust police officers' recollections of
what occurred at the expense of the criminal defendant's account. Thus, in the absence of
a tape recording, the prosecuting authorities invariably win the swearing contest." Harris,
678P.2dat414.
Therefore, as argued in Appellant's opening brief, current safeguards are insufficient
to assure that the mandates of due process are enforced in a judicial setting. (See Aplt. Br.
at 12, noting that it is beyond dispute that false confessions still occur; citing State v.
Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2003); Aplt. Br. at 13, arguing that there is an amount of
inherent unreliability that attaches to unrecorded confessions; Aplt. Br. at 13, arguing that
the State invariably prevails where there is a dispute as to what occurred during an
unrecorded interrogation; Aplt. Br. at 19 arguing that the dicta in current Utah case law
inadequately assures the recording of interrogations).
Appellant further argued that the current case law, merely encouraging recording, is
insufficient to ensure that a defendant's rights are adequately protected. (Aplt. Br. at 19;
citing Villarreal 889 P.2d at 426; State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989); State v.
James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Utah App. 1993)). Appellant also argued that the verbatim
recording of interrogations in places of detention where recording is feasible is necessary to
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assure defendants the protections of due process. Consequently, Appellant demonstrated in
his opening brief that current safeguards do adequately address and protect the right to due
process and that the adoption of Appellant's proposed rule is, therefore, a necessary
precaution.
The State summarily asserts that Appellant failed to demonstrate that current
procedural safeguards are insufficient to ensure the mandates of due process. (Aplee. Br. at
16). However, as previously established, Appellant did challenge the sufficiency of current
safeguards and argued that recording was necessary to fulfill the requirements of due process.
The State fails to demonstrate how the safeguards currently in place, where the failure to
record interrogations is common, adequately ensures fundamental fairness. Appellant fully
described the inadequacies of the current state of the law and argued that the current
inadequacy was one policy factor that this Court should consider. The fact that Appellant
later detailed many policy factors in favor of adopting said rule does not vitiate his first
argument that current safeguards are constitutionally inadequate. (See e.g. Aplt. Br. at 12,
13, 19).
The recording of custodial interrogations protects the rights of the accused and ensures
that the trial court has a full and complete record upon which to determine whether the
mandates of Miranda and Dickerson were complied with. However, a recording also
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protects the interests of the State and the individual interests of police officers wrongfully
accused of improper interrogation tactics. In many cases, a verbatim recording could confirm
the voluntariness of a confession and, in all cases, it would help courts ascertain the truth of
what occurred in an interrogation behind closed doors. (Geller, Videotaping Interrogations
and Confessions, National Institute of Justice, March 1993). The demonstrated inadequacies
of current procedural safeguards coupled with these important policy considerations
indicating that a recording requirement is essential, demonstrates that the rule proposed
herein should be adopted as an element of due process under the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his
conviction under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of August, 2004.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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